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STATE OF IDAHO, 
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V. 
CULLEN ROBERT SIMS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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) 
) 
NO. 41078 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2012-15562 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
________ ) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cullen Robert Sims respectfully requests that this Court grant review in this 
matter, which relates to the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Sims, Docket 
Number 41078, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No.626 (Ct. App. July 17, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). Review should be granted in this case, because the Opinion is inconsistent 
with the Court of Appeals' precedent. 
This appeal concerns a credit for time served issue. Mr. Sims was arrested in 
this matter for felony eluding and for a parole violation in an unrelated matter. 
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(R., p.133.) Mr. Sims was initially charged with felony eluding and, at later date, the 
State filed an amended complaint adding charges for, among other things, felony 
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and/or a controlled substance. 
(R., pp.7-8, 65-67.) Mr. Sims pleaded guilty to the felony DUI charge and the State 
dismissed the eluding charge. (R., pp.98, 111.) 
On appeal, Mr. Sims argued that he was entitled to credit for time served from 
the date of his arrest, August 9, 2012, to the date of his sentencing hearing. The Court 
of Appeals disagreed and held that Mr. Sims' presentence incarceration was only 
attributable to the eluding offense because that offense was charged in the original 
complaint. In other words, since the DUI offense was charged in the amended 
complaint, his presentence incarceration was not attributable to that offense, and, as 
such, he was not entitled to any pre-judgment credit for time served because the 
eluding offense was dismissed due to the plea negotiations. 
Review should be granted because the Opinion is contrary to Court of Appeals' 
precedent which holds that when a defendant is charged in one multi-count indictment 
or complaint, the defendant is entitled to credit for time served against each count, 
unless the sentences are ordered to run consecutively. In this case, Mr. Sims was 
involved in one criminal transaction and was charged in a multi-count complaint. Under 
the Court of Appeals' precedent, he is entitled to credit for time served against each of 
these charges, not just the eluding charge which was dismissed due to the plea 
negotiations. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On August 9, 20·1 police observed Mr. Sims driving a car and attempted to stop 
him in order to serve an arrest warrant for a parole violation. (R., p.133.) Instead of 
stopping his car, Mr. Sims rammed a police vehicle and drove away. (R., p.133.) 
Mr. Sims eventually collided with a third party, and he fell unconscious. (R., p.133; 
01/16/13 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.14, p.21, Ls.2-4.) After the accident, a police officer 
approached Mr. Sims' car and noticed a white baggie in his mouth. (01/16/13 Tr., p.11, 
L.25 - p.12, L.7.) Mr. Sims was then "taken into custody for felony eluding and his 
outstanding felony parole violation." (R., p.133.) After being arrested, Mr. Sims was 
taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries. (R., p.133.) While at the hospital, a 
sample of Mr. Sims' blood was drawn and sent to the state crime lab for testing. 
(01/16/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-12.) 
On October 17, 2012, the State filed a complaint charging Mr. Sims with felony 
eluding and misdemeanor obstructing. (R., pp.7-8.) On November 21, 2012, Mr. Sims 
was served with an arrest warrant based on the eluding and obstructing charges. 
(R., pp.134-135.) On January 16, 2013, the State filed an amended complaint charging 
Mr. Sims with felony eluding, felony DUI, felony possession of a controlled substance, 
felony destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence, and misdemeanor 
obstructing. (R., pp.65-67.) 
After a preliminary hearing, Mr. Sims was bound over to the district court for 
felony eluding, felony DUI, felony possession of a controlled substance, and 
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misdemeanor obstructing. 1 (R., pp.65-67.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Sims 
pleaded guilty to felony DUI and, in return, the State dismissed the remaining charges. 
(R., pp.98, 111.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen 
years, with seven and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.111-113.) This sentence was 
ordered to run concurrently with his sentence in the parole case, Ada County Case CR 
2009-2073. (R., p.112; Tr., p.21, Ls.8-17.) Mr. Sims timely appealed. (R., pp.118-120.) 
Mr. Sims then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35(c) requesting credit for time 
served from the date of his arrest, which was denied by the district court. (R., pp.121-
123.) Mr. Sims then filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his credit for time served 
motion. (R., pp.125-133.) In support of this second motion, Mr. Sims provided a police 
report indicating that on August 9, 2012, he was "taken into custody for felony eluding 
and his outstanding felony parole violation." (R., p.133.) The district court denied this 
motion because, according to the district court, Mr. Sims did not provide any information 
indicating that he was placed under arrest prior to November 21, 2012. (R., pp.134-
135.) Mr. Sims filed an amended notice of appeal. (R., pp.136-139.) 
1 The magistrate did not find probable cause for the charge of destruction, alteration or 
concealment of evidence. (01/16/13 Tr., p.31, Ls.12-19; R., pp.59-61.) 
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ISSUE 
Should review be granted, as the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the District 
Court's order denying Mr. Sims' motion for credit for time served is inconsistent with 
prior Court of Appeals' precedent? 
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ARGUMENT 
Review Should Be Granted, As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The 
District Court's Order Denying Mr. Sims' Motion For Credit For Time Served Is 
Inconsistent With Prior Court Of Appeals' Precedent 
A. Introduction 
Pre-judgment credit for time served is awarded pursuant to I.C. § 18-309, which 
is triggered by the date a defendant is physically taken into custody for an offense. 
Idaho Code Section 18-309 is mandatory and, as such, does not afford the district court 
any discretion to deny credit against a sentence. Mr. Sims was taken into custody for 
the underlying offense on August 9, 2012, and should be awarded credit for time served 
from that date. Since Mr. Sims was charged in one multi-count complaint he is entitled 
to credit for time served against all of the charges in that complaint. The mere fact that 
he was initially arrested for and charged with eluding, but eventually pleaded guilty to an 
amended charge for DUI does not change this analysis. 
B. Applicable Standards 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b ). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered 
though. Rule 11 S(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be 
considered in evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first 
impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
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3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 11 S(b). Mr. Sims argues that this Court should grant review because the Court of 
Appeals' Opinion is inconsistent with its own precedent. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which Idaho appellate 
courts exercise free review. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 
139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003). When an appellant challenges a district court's factual 
findings on appeal, the appellant has the burden to establish that the factual findings are 
clearly erroneous. State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557, 560 (Ct. App. 2005). "Findings are 
clearly erroneous only when unsupported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. 
C. The Court Of Appeals Erred When It Affirmed The District Court's Order 
Denying Mr. Sims' Motion For Credit For Time Served 
Idaho Code Section 18-309 controls Mr. Sims' request for credit for pre-judgment 
time served. The applicable portion of that statute provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom 
the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any 
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was 
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. 
I.C. § 18-309. "[T]he provisions of I.C. § 18-309 are mandatory and do not confer upon 
the trial court discretion to disallow credit on a sentence." State v. Albertson, 135 Idaho 
723, 726 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The requirement - that credit for time served is only awarded 
"if such incarceration was for the offense or and included for which the judgment was 
entered" - has been interpreted to mean that credit for time served is awarded under 
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circumstances where the imposition of the sentence is attributable "to the charge or 
conduct" for which the sentence is imposed. State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765 
(Ct. App. 1989) ( emphasis added). 
Mr. Sims argues that, when a defendant is charged in a multi-count complaint 
stemming from one larger criminal transaction, the defendant is entitled to credit for time 
served against each of the charges, unless the sentences are ordered to run 
consecutively. In State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (1981), this Court held, that when a 
defendant is charged with multiple counts and the sentences are ordered to run 
consecutively, the defendant is only entitled to pre-judgment credit for time served 
against one of the consecutive sentences. Id. at 352. Conversely, in State v. 
Hernandez, 120 Idaho 785 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Court of Appeals held that, when a 
defendant is charged in one county under a multi-count complaint and the sentences 
are ordered to run concurrently, the defendant is entitled to pre-judgment credit for time 
served against all the concurrent sentences because the presentence confinement is 
equally attributable to all counts. Id. at 792; see also State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 851 
(Ct. App. 1993). The policy behind those holdings follows: 
We view the policy behind [I.C. § 18-309] to be that a defendant is 
entitled to have the time he has already served in confinement ascribed to 
each charge upon which he receives a sentence to be served 
concurrently, so that if for some reason one of the charges becomes 
nullified, the defendant is credited for the proper amount of time on the 
other charge or charges. 
Hernandez, 120 Idaho at 792. (emphasis added). Moreover, it is presumed that 
sentences run concurrently, unless a court expressly orders sentences to run 
consecutively. State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 667 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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Therefore, when a defendant is charged in a multi-count complaint, absent an 
order to the contrary, the sentences are presumed to run concurrently and the 
defendant is entitled to credit for time served against each sentence since credit for time 
served is awarded when presentence incarceration is attributable to either the charged 
offense or the underlying criminal conduct. Hale, 116 Idaho at 765. This is because 
presentence confinement is equally attributable to all counts in the multi-count 
complaint. Horn, 124 Idaho at 851. This rule ensures that a defendant will receive the 
credit to which s/he is entitled in the event one or more of the charges becomes 
nullified. Hernandez, 120 Idaho at 792. 
Mr. Sims recognizes that his case does not deal with the issue of concurrent 
sentences. However, he still argues the Courts of Appeals' holding in the Opinion runs 
afoul its foregoing precedent because he was denied credit for pre-judgment 
incarceration from the date of his arrest because of the dismissal, i.e. nullification, of the 
felony eluding charge. This occurred due to the unique procedural developments in this 
case. Mr. Sims was initially arrested for felony eluding, and the State filed a complaint 
charging him only with eluding. (R., pp.7-8, 133.) A few months later, the State 
amended the complaint, alleging, among other things, that Mr. Sims was driving under 
the influence of methamphetamine while he was eluding the police. (R., pp.65-67.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Sims pleaded guilty to the DUI charge, and the State 
dismissed the eluding charge. (R., pp.98, 111.) Despite this procedural development, 
the Court of Appeals held that Mr. Sims' presentence confinement was only attributable 
to the eluding charge and not the DUI charge. This is inconsistent with the Court of 
Appeals' precedent because credit for time served is generally applied to all counts in a 
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multi-count complaint in order to ensure that a defendant, like Mr. Sims, still receives 
his/her credit for pre-judgment incarceration, even though one of the charges was 
nullified. 
Additionally, the conduct underlying Mr. Sims' eluding charge and DUI charge 
arose from the same criminal transaction, and the State has treated it as such ever 
since his arrest on August 9, 2012. For example, all of the charges in the amended 
complaint refer to the events which occurred on August 9, 2012. (R., pp.59-61.) 
Moreover, approximately three hours after Mr. Sims' August 9, 2012, arrest for eluding, 
his blood was drawn and sent to the state crime laboratory for testing. (0"1/16/13 
Tr., p.18, L.17 - p.20, L.18, p.26, L.10 - p.27, L.25.) This occurred because the police 
suspected that Mr. Sims was driving under the influence of methamphetamine. 
(01/16/13 Tr., p.18, L.17 - p.20, L.18, p.26, L.10 - p.27, L.25.) Those test results were 
used as evidence against Mr. Sims in support of the DUI charge. (01/16/13 Tr., p.28, 
Ls.1-7, p.30, L.9 - p.31, L.11.) Since Mr. Sims was arrested for eluding and the police 
immediately began a DUI investigation, the eluding offense and the DUI offense were 
both part of the same criminal transaction. The Court of Appeals' holdings in Hale, 
Hernandez, and Horn, lead to the conclusion that Mr. Sims' presentence incarceration 
was attributable to this conduct and, therefore, he should receive credit for time served 
against each of the charges levied against him. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' holding in this matter sets an unsafe 
precedent because it encourages prosecutors to strategically make charging decisions 
as a means to manipulate credit for time served. For example, a prosecutor could 
charge a defendant in an initial complaint with a count which has weak evidentiary 
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support, with the intent of dismissing that charge during plea negations, and 
subsequently file an amended complaint with stronger charges. In the event the weak 
charge is dismissed during plea negotiations or a jury enters an acquittal as to that 
charge, the prosecutor could then argue the defendant is not entitled to credit for any of 
the time served as to the charges brought in the amended complaint. That is 
particularly troubling if the defendant is incarcerated for several months while awaiting 
trial. In this case, the State could have included all of the charges in the original 
complaint. 2 
Another problem with the Court of Appeals' approach is that any defendant in 
Mr. Sims' situation would need to be informed, prior to the entry of the guilty plea, that 
credit for time served hinges on the particular offense to which the defendant pleads 
guilty. See I.C.R. 11 (c)(2) (prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea a defendant must be 
"informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum 
punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply); see a/so Ray v. State, 
133 Idaho 96, 99 (1999). Under the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in this 
case, defendants that are not provided with the appropriate credit for time served 
warnings will have a basis to withdraw their guilty pleas. Mr. Sims submits that this 
procedure is far more cumbersome than granting credit for time served pursuant to Rule 
35(c). 
Review should be granted because the Court of Appeals Opinion is inconsistent 
with its own precedent. Since Mr. Sims was charged in one county under a multi-count 
2 Mr. Sims is not suggesting that the prosecutor, in this matter, was attempting to 
manipulate credit for time served. The reasonable inference from the facts is that 
prosecutor was waiting for the test results from the state crime lab before charging 
Mr. Sims with DUI. 
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complaint, which stemmed from one criminal transaction, he is entitled to credit for time 
served as to all the offenses charged in that complaint and not just the eluding offense 
which was nullified due to the prosecutor's charging decisions and the plea 
negotiations. 
D. The District Court Erred It Denied Mr. Sims' Motion For Credit For Time Served 
The district court employed a slightly different rationale than the Court of Appeals 
when it denied Mr. Sims motion for credit for time served. According to the district 
court, Mr. Sims was not entitled to credit for time served from August 9, 2012, to 
November 21, 2012, because he was immediately taken to a hospital for treatment and 
was not served an arrest warrant for these charges until November 21, 2012.3 
(R., pp.133-134.) Mr. Sims argues that he is entitled to credit for time served as of 
August 9, 2012, because he was in physical custody when he was arrested and 
transported to the hospital. He also argues the fact he was served with an arrest 
warrant after he was taken into physical custody is irrelevant to the calculation for credit 
for presentence incarceration. 
The district court's conclusion that Mr. Sims is not entitled to credit for time 
served during the period of time he spent in a hospital after his arrest is erroneous 
because Mr. Sims was in custody during his stay at the hospital.4 The mere fact a 
defendant is taken to a hospital for medical treatment after an arrest does not change 
3 Unlike the Court of Appeals' holding, that Mr. Sims was not entitled to any credit for 
time served (Opinion, pp.4-5), the district court determined that Mr. Sims was entitled to 
credit for time served from the date he was served with an arrest warrant, November 21, 
2012, to the date of his sentencing hearing. (R., pp.112, 134-135.) 
4 Both the Court of Appeals and the State agreed with Mr. Sims as to this assignment of 
error. (Opinion, p.3 n.1; Respondent's Brief, p.8.) 
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the fact that the defendant is under arrest and not free to leave the hospital. In this 
case, Mr. Sims was accompanied by law enforcement while he was being treated and 
his blood sample was drawn. (Tr., p.20, L.5 - p.21, L.6.) Mr. Sims' situation is the same 
as defendant who is initially deemed incompetent to stand trial and subsequently sent to 
a mental health facility to regain his/her competency. Such defendants are entitled to 
credit for time served pursuant to I.C. § 18-309 because they are in custody during their 
stay at a mental health facility, which is legally indistinguishable from a defendant who is 
initially taken to a hospital after an arrest. Moreover, a "prisoner on work release 
remains 'incarcerated' for that time even though he is outside the physical confines of a 
jail or correctional facility for extended periods of time." Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 
869-870 (Ct. App. 2008). If a prisoner on work release is entitled to credit for time 
served, then a defendant who is being accompanied by police at a hospital is surely 
entitled to credit for time served as the hospitalized defendant enjoys significantly less 
freedom than the prisoner on work release. 
Additionally, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Sims is not entitled to credit 
for time served during the period he received medical treatment runs afoul the plain 
language of I.C. § 18-309. When statute is interpreted the court begins with the literal 
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho 
at 69. Courts "cannot insert into statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not 
there." Matter of Adoption of Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 558 (1995). As stated above, 
I.C. § 18-309 requires a defendant to receive credit for time served for all the time spent 
in custody prior to the entry of the judgment. The district court's determination that 
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Mr. Sims is not entitled to credit for custodial medical treatment requires the court to add 
a medical exception to I.C. § 18-309, which ignores the plain meaning of I.C. § 18-309 
by inserting surplusage that is not in the statute. 
The district court's conclusion that Mr. Sims was only entitled to credit for time 
served from the date he was served with an arrest warrant is also erroneous. The 
district court expressly stated that the "service of the arrest warrant constitutes 
incarceration .... " (R., p.135.) Contrary to the district court's conclusion, there is no 
such requirement that a defendant be served with an arrest warrant in order to receive 
credit for time served pursuantto I.C. § 18-309. In fact, that statute makes no reference 
to an arrest warrant at all. See generally I.C. § 18-309. Instead, the statute provides 
that a defendant "shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration 
prior to entry of judgment .... " I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added). The clear and plain 
meaning of the statute requires a district court to order credit for pre-judgment 
incarceration regardless of whether the defendant has been served with an arrest 
warrant. If the district court's conclusion were true, then defendants who are arrested 
before any formal proceedings have commenced would not receive credit for pre-
judgment incarceration. Such a result runs afoul the plain language of I.C. § 18-309. 
Further support for Mr. Sims' position can be found in I.C. § 20-209A, which 
further addresses credit for time served both before and after judgment. It states: 
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his 
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is 
sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for time 
spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that 
detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was 
imposed. 
14 
I.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added). This statute makes clear that pre-judgment credit for 
time served is calculated by the time a defendant is in actual custody, not upon the 
service of an arrest warrant. 
In sum, the district court's ruling that Mr. Sims was not in custody for this offense 
because received medical treatment after his arrest was erroneous because he never 
had the ability to leave the hospital and was accompanied by police during his stay at 
the hospital. Moreover, the district court erred when it determined that Mr. Sims was 
not entitled to credit from the date he was taken into custody because I.C. § 18-309 
requires that credit be awarded based on the date a defendant is taken into physical 
custody, as opposed to the date an arrest warrant served. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sims respectfully requests that this Court grant review. In the event this 
Court grants review, Mr. Sims respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district 
court's orders denying him credit for time served and remand this case for an order 
granting him proper credit for time served pursuant to I.C. § 18-309. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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